Reshaping Australian drug policy: the dilemmas of generic medicines policy by Löfgren, Hans
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 4
(page number not for citation purposes)
Australia and New Zealand Health 
Policy
Open Access Commentary
Reshaping Australian drug policy: the dilemmas of generic 
medicines policy
Hans Löfgren*
Address: School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
Email: Hans Löfgren* - hans.lofgren@deakin.edu.au
* Corresponding author    
With this edition, Australia New Zealand Health Policy pub-
lishes four articles on the theme of Australian and interna-
tional generic medicines market dynamics and policy
dilemmas. Changes soon to be introduced to pricing
arrangements under Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme (PBS) make this focus particularly topical.
Beecroft presents a community pharmacy perspective on
these issues. Faunce and Lexchin explore the vexed issue
of 'evergreening' in Australia and Canada, with a compar-
ative emphasis on the implications of bilateral trade
agreements between these countries and the US. In a sec-
ond article, Faunce investigates the generics sector from an
industrial renewal perspective, arguing that it would be
perilous to fail to develop a systematic approach to the
promotion of this industry grounded in public good con-
siderations. The present author provides an analysis of
international generics markets which highlights the rise of
competitive Indian suppliers.
Most medicines do not have to be expensive. Manufactur-
ing costs are generally low and many off-patent drugs can
be sourced at prices which reflect intense competition in
global markets. In September 2006 in Florida, for exam-
ple, Wal-Mart announced that each of 331 generic drugs,
covering 143 compounds in more than twenty therapeu-
tic categories, would be made available for a monthly cost
of US$4.00. This scheme has since been extended across
the US and competitors have introduced similar programs
[1]. In Australia and elsewhere, governments are introduc-
ing changes to drug policy in order to extend the use of
cheaper generic medicines. They face two central ques-
tions: to what extent and in what ways should the pricing
of patented medicines be linked to the pricing of out-of-
patent drugs, and how can the cost of complex and expen-
sive sales and distribution systems be contained?
PBS pricing arrangements have, until now, largely pre-
cluded Australian tax payers from benefiting from the
ready availability of cheap generics. To address this anom-
aly, the Health Minister, Tony Abbott, announced a policy
package in November 2006 intended to ensure 'better
value' through lower prices in the off-patent market [2].
As the number of major drugs facing patent expiry multi-
plied, pressures for lower generics prices had become
increasingly compelling. The proposed reforms are
intended to rein in the interrelated problems of unneces-
sarily high PBS prices for generics and the large discounts
(labelled 'secret kickbacks' in the media) provided to
pharmacists by generics suppliers. It leaves to one side
more difficult questions of transparency and accountabil-
ity in the pricing of 'innovative' brand name pharmaceu-
ticals.
The government is hoping that the new initiatives will cre-
ate a stable medicines policy environment for years to
come. This follows a period of uncertainty which peaked
with the stop-gap introduction in 2005 of a mandatory
12.5% price cut on the launch of the first alternative brand
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of an already PBS-listed drug. Following furious brand
name industry lobbying the government stepped back
from mandating, as initially intended, a repeat price cut
on the introduction of each subsequent brand [3].
As the number of big-selling out-of-patent drugs
increases, so does the possibility of achieving large PBS
cost savings through lower generics prices. But the realisa-
tion of this potential requires a new pricing model accept-
able to all the major stakeholders: the manufacturers of
patented drugs and Australia's small group of specialised
generics suppliers, pharmacists, wholesalers, prescribers
and consumers. Through a lengthy period of behind-the-
scenes discussions, the government appears to have come
up with a reform package which enjoys the support of
major interest groups, most importantly the suppliers of
originator brands (through Medicines Australia) and the
Pharmacy Guild of Australia. This required the ditching of
models for tendering of generics, and for mandatory pre-
scription by generic name, though these had possibly
served as government bargaining chips rather than serious
proposals.
The off-patent drug market in Australia is already large
and growing, comprising more than half of all PBS items.
Around 40% of listings have generic competitors and a
further 12%, though still patented, are affected through
the reference pricing system (explained briefly below) [4].
In value terms, patent-expired PBS drugs represent annual
sales of about $3 billion, with generics (non-originator
brands) accounting for about $1.3 billion or 43%. This
gives non-originator brands a share of total PBS expendi-
ture of around 18%, or about 25–30% of prescriptions
[5]. Alphapharm, the dominant generics company in Aus-
tralia, is the leading supplier to the PBS in volume terms,
ahead of Pfizer [6]. But in comparison with the UK and
the US, where well above 50% of prescriptions are dis-
pensed with generics, and European countries such as the
Netherlands (around 44%) and Denmark (around 70%),
the proportion of prescriptions dispensed with a generic
remains small in Australia. Originator products retain the
lion's share of the off-patent market and, in many cases,
continue to be the only brand available, particularly
where its price is relatively low, with consequent weak
commercial incentives for entry by new suppliers. Origi-
nator brands continue to do well, even where a generic
alternative is available: in this market segment, almost
40% of prescriptions are still dispensed with a brand pre-
mium.
The dominance of brand suppliers is explained by typi-
cally small PBS price differentials between originator and
generics brands. Pricing incentives are consequently weak
for doctors and consumers to choose a generic rather than
the originator brand. The PBS listing and pricing process
has hitherto delivered relatively favourable prices for pat-
ented drugs but, as noted by the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Pricing Authority (PBPA), 'in general, the prices Australian
taxpayers pay for generic medicines are high compared to
some other OECD countries' [[6], p. 12]. The reference
pricing system, administered by the PBPA, is at the centre
of this conundrum. It ensures that price cuts flow through
to all other suppliers of the same or similar products, and
there is thus no incentive for suppliers to compete on
price to the PBS. Generics suppliers have instead found an
inroad into the PBS market though discounts or large
'trading terms' offered to pharmacists, commonly around
30% and sometimes in the order of 50% or more. In other
words, pharmacists have been reimbursed by the govern-
ment at prices well above the prices actually paid. From a
pharmacy perspective, these 'trading terms' are considered
ordinary business deals which reward efficiencies and
scale, and have come to be integrated into overall profita-
bility, as explained by Beecroft. These discounts have also
provided incentives for pharmacists to encourage the
uptake of generics by consumers. In their absence, the
more attractive option would be support for the brand
names rather than investing effort in converting patients
to generics. But the fact that a large share of the cost ben-
efits of cheap generics has flowed to pharmacists through
these discounts, while PBS generics prices continued to
approximate those of the originator brands, has riled the
government.
Reference pricing, a basic premise of the PBS system, is, as
already noted, intended to deliver similar prices for drugs
with identical or similar therapeutic effects. Most OECD
countries apply some form of reference pricing, though
this approach is almost always accompanied by heated
controversy [7,8]. In Australia, prices of alternative brands
and drugs in the same therapeutic class are key factors
taken account of by the PBPA when considering pricing
issues. The critical question is: precisely which products
should be considered interchangeable and, on that basis,
be assigned the same (reimbursement) price? It is
accepted almost universally that, to all intents and pur-
poses, alternative generic brands are identical to origina-
tor products. The contrary position used to be pressed
strongly by originator companies but cannot be held cred-
ibly today, more than twenty years after the 1984 US Wax-
man-Hatch Act, which created the modern generics
industry. But where are the lines to be drawn where prod-
ucts have similar therapeutic effects without being chemi-
cally identical? Should patented products be referenced
against off-patent drugs which deliver similar therapeutic
effects? Here opposed perspectives clash: innovator com-
panies seek premium pricing for all newly patented drugs,
irrespective of the extent of their marginal benefits com-
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the mandate of the PBS and similar insurance systems is
to deliver cost-effective outcomes for tax payers.
A case in point is the statin group of cholesterol-lowering
drugs, considered interchangeable for PBS reference pric-
ing purposes. In August 2005, generic brands of simvasta-
tin (principal brand name Zocor) were listed on the PBS
for the first time, and a reduction in the price paid by the
government was to affect all statin products (as a conse-
quence of the 12.5% mandatory price cut in such circum-
stances), including Pfizer's still-patented Lipitor. A special
submission by Pfizer to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advi-
sory Committee (PBAC) was required for Lipitor to retain
its price 'on the grounds that Lipitor is more effective than
simvastatin in lowering cholesterol' [9]. Clearly, the brand
industry would rather not have to engage in such battles
whenever regulators seek to reference a patented drug
against off-patent alternatives. The present system makes
this eventuality increasingly likely, as more patents expire
and the 'innovator industry' continues to 'churn out'
modified versions of existing drugs (with new patents)
and 'me-too' products bringing marginal (if any) thera-
peutic benefits, rather than break-through products open-
ing up new 'blockbuster' (billion dollar plus) markets.
The central role of Medicines Australia in the formation of
the new generics policy may at first glance seem surprising
since it is likely to result in an accelerated loss of market
share for originator products. But the major gain for its
member companies is a weakening of the reference pric-
ing system, which will impact on the way that cost-assess-
ment analyses are undertaken as part of the PBS listing
process, through separation of all PBS items into two
groups, F1 and F2, subject to different pricing arrange-
ments. F1 medicines are those for which only a single
brand is listed, mainly because of a patent, but will pre-
sumably also include off-patent drugs with only one sup-
plier. F2 medicines have direct competition and are
divided into two groups: one for products 'where price
competition between brands is low' and one 'where com-
petition between brands is high', i.e. those for which large
discounts have been provided. Prices for products in the
first group will be cut by 2% over three years from 2008,
and those in the latter group will be subject to a one-off
price drop of 25% on 1 August 2008. Price disclosure, that
is, a requirement that the actual price paid by pharmacists
be made known to the government, will be introduced
over time for drugs in both groups. Pharmacists will be
compensated for the impact of these adjustments in the
period of the current Government-Pharmacy Guild agree-
ment (which runs until mid-2010) through increases in
the dispensing fee and the mark-up, and some other new
incentive payments [10].
It is too early to assess the implications of these changes.
Many aspects of the new arrangements are yet to be final-
ised, such as how price disclosures are to be administered.
But a likely effect will be higher prices for newly listed
(non-breakthrough) patented drugs than would have
been the case under the present model. The details of the
legislation, which is expected in the present term of parlia-
ment, are to be worked through within a small group of
individuals from industry and government, apparently
excluding consumer representatives.
A further reason for Medicines Australia not to be overly
troubled by these changes is that its member companies
are the suppliers, directly or indirectly, of many generics.
When launching the new policy, Minister Abbott asserted
that '70 percent of the Australian generics market is occu-
pied by companies which are not members of the Gener-
ics Medicines industry Association' (GMiA) but members
of Medicines Australia [2]. Indeed, in Australia and inter-
nationally, the historical dividing line between the gener-
ics and originator sectors has been much weakened, a
development explored in my article on 'The global biop-
harma industry and the rise of Indian drug multination-
als'. This has been made evident by, for example, the role
of Novartis as the world's second largest generics supplier,
through its subsidiary Sandoz. Sanofi-aventis has a similar
subsidiary, while Alphapharm and other generics compa-
nies also market patented products. Originator companies
also manipulate markets through the shadowy practice of
'authorised generics', launched to forestall genuine com-
petition, common not only in the US but also in Australia.
These are originator products marketed by, or licensed
from, the originator company but sold under a generic
name [11-13]. Faunce and Lexchin argue that 'linkage
evergreening' may loom as an increasing threat to a sus-
tainable generics industry in Australia, and argue for the
public health benefits of a regulatory agency to police this
area similar to Canada's Office of Patented Medicines and
Liaison.
For their part, pharmacists are pleased that they will be
largely compensated for the projected loss of income from
the winding back of discounts. Changes to pharmacy
remuneration will, according to the Health Minister,
'ensure that the position of pharmacists for the life of the
current [government-PGA] agreement is as it would other-
wise have been' [2]. Most consumers will experience no
direct effects though it is possible that 'general consumers'
paying the full co-payment ($30.70 in 2007) will pay less
for some off-patent drugs priced below this level.
The argument pressed by Medicines Australia, and
accepted by other stakeholders, is that lower generics
prices will free up financial resources for the listing of new
patented medicines and allow for PBS prices that betterPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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reflect 'rewards for innovation', including 'incremental
innovation', that is, marginal improvements that regula-
tors may consider to be of little if any therapeutic benefit.
The pivotal claim by 'big pharma' companies, supported
by the US government in trade negotiations and in other
contexts, has long been that drug prices in Australia do
not reward 'innovation' adequately [14,15]. Again, it is
too early to assess the precise implications of the new pol-
icy, but the general point to be made in this context is that
the cost-effectiveness principle – that the costs and incre-
mental benefits of making available a new medicinal drug
to a patient population should be compared with those of
alternative treatments – applies logically across all seg-
ments of the pharmaceutical market, irrespective of how
off-patent drugs are priced.
The new policy has not been welcomed by the GMiA
which believes that it will weaken incentives for the use of
'true generics' [16]. The likely business dynamics of the
generics sector in the new policy environment is indeed
uncertain. Alphapharm and Sigma Pharmaceuticals pres-
ently control in excess of 80% of this market though
Genepharm Australasia and other firms anticipate rapid
expansion and growing market share on the assumption
that present arrangements would not be radically altered.
In response to the concerns of the GMiA, the Health Min-
ister claims that the new system will provide 'systemic
protection' for incumbent suppliers and 'should ensure
that domestic generic manufacturers are less at risk from
predatory newcomers such as some of the Indian generic
drug manufacturers' [2]. The new arrangements are
viewed in an analysis in the Australian Financial Review as
'carefully crafted to protect inefficient pharmacists and the
local oligopoly of drug manufacturers'. The only opportu-
nity for price competition which has been available to
new generics entrants – discounts to pharmacists – is now
being removed 'and the local manufacturers will be
breathing easier' [17]. This points to the unanswered
question of what form competition will take in the gener-
ics market as price disclosure is phased in. But there is no
doubt that international and in particular Indian low cost
suppliers such as Ranbaxy, which now has a presence in
Australia, in coming years will have a significant impact,
in one way or another, on the PBS market.
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